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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:

Case No.

890175

:

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,

Priority No.

2

Defendant/Petitioner.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a class "A" misdemeanor, in
the Third Judicial District Court.

This Court granted certiorari

from the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the
conviction.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant was reasonably detained under

fourth amendment standards as a passenger in a vehicle stopped
for a defective taillight?
2.

Whether defendant failed to preserve a claim that

her detention violated Utah Const, art. I § 14?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV.:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Const, art. I, § 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982):
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, was charged with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class "B"
misdemeanor, and possession of burglary tools, a class "B"
misdemeanor (R. 7-8). Defendant was convicted of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a class "A" misdemeanor, on
April 1, 1987, after a bench trial in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding (R. 99). The remaining charges
were dismissed on the State's motion. Id.

Judge Uno placed

defendant on probation for a period of one year (R. 98-99).
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's
conviction on March 2, 1989.
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326

(See Appendix "A"; opinion.)

granted certiorari on June 12, 1989 (R. 143).

This Court

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff Stroud stopped a
vehicle for having a faulty brake light (T. 5-6).

Defendant was

a passenger in that vehicle (T. 7). At the suppression hearing,
Stroud testified that prior to stopping the vehicle, he ran a
check on the license plate and obtained the name of the
registered owner (T. 6). He then approached the stopped vehicle
and asked the driver for her license (T. 6). The name on the
license was not the name of the registered owner (T. 6).
When Stroud requested the registration certificate, the
driver was unable to produce it (T. 6). Stroud then asked
defendant for identification, reasoning that there was a
possibility the car was stolen because there was no registration
and no owner present (T. 6-8). After initially denying that she
had any identification, defendant told Stroud her name and
birthdate (T. 7).
Stating that he would be right back and expecting the
driver and defendant to remain, Stroud returned to his vehicle
and ran license checks on the two, determining that the driver
was driving on a suspended license and that defendant had several
outstanding warrants (T. 7-8, 21-22).

He did not, however,

inquire as to whether the car was stolen, nor did he know of any
reports of stolen cars matching that car's description (T. 12).
He then wrote a citation on the driver and requested a backup
police officer (T. 8).
This factual statement is taken from the Court of Appeals
opinion in State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 326-27 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). (See Appendix "A"; Opinion.)

When defendant was informed that she was being arrested
for outstanding warrants, she exited the vehicle, holding a
backpack which had the name "Karen" on it (T. 9). Defendant
initially denied that the backpack belonged to her, but later
admitted that it was hers (T. 9-10, 29). Incident to her arrest,
the bag was searched and was found to contain amphetamines, drug
paraphernalia, and defendant's Utah identification (T. 10-11, 14)
(State's Exhibit 1)•
Defendant's version of the sequence of events varies
from Stroud's.

She testified that after Stroud received the

driver's license, he asked defendant if she had any
identification (T. 25). She said that she did not.

^d.

He told

them to wait, that he would be right back, and returned to his
vehicle for five or ten minutes, long enough for her to smoke a
cigarette or two (T. 26). When he returned, he asked for the
registration certificate.

Jki. When it could not be produced,

Stroud asked defendant to return to his vehicle with him, where,
at his request, she gave him her name and birthdate (T. 26-27).
He then sent her back to the other car.

Id.

Fifteen minutes

later, he came back to their car, gave the driver a citation,
took defendant out of the car, frisked and handcuffed her, and
put her in the front seat of the sheriff's car (T. 28). She had
possession of her bag at this time (T. 28-29).

Defendant stated

that she gave Stroud her name and birthdate because she was
required to do so, and did not believe that she could leave (T.
27, 31-32).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant was reasonably detained under fourth
amendment standards as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for an
equipment violation.

The officer had reasonable suspicion to

detain the vehicle occupants to investigate whether the vehicle
was lawfully possessed reasonable suspicion was based upon the
articulated facts that the owner was not present and no
registration was in the vehicle.

Thus, trial court and Court of

Appeals correctly concluded that defendant was not unreasonably
detained under fourth amendment standards.
Defendant failed to analyze or argue in the trial court
a more restrictive search and seizure standard under art. I § 14
of the Utah Constitution.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals

properly refused to address defendant's unpreserved claim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION WAS REASONABLE UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence seized from her person incident to her
arrest on outstanding warrants.

She alleges that the evidence

was the fruit of an illegal detention when she was temporarily
restrained as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a minor
traffic violation.

Defendant's claim must fail.

The preliminary issue is whether defendant was actually
detained.

The trial court did not make a clear finding whether

or not there was a detention (T. 48). Instead, the court ruled

-5-

that the deputy could have properly detained defendant for a
reasonable period of time while investigating the traffic stop
(T. 48).
The Utah Court of Appeals went further and decided that
defendant was seized "when Stroud took her name and birthdate and
expected her to wait while he ran a warrants check."
771 P.2d at 328.

Johnson,

The court found that "defendant was reasonably

justified in her belief that she was not free to go."

Ixi; see

also State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (a
seizure occurs when a reasonable person under the totality of the
circumstances believes he or she is not free to leave); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
The State concedes that defendant was seized within the
meaning of the fourth amendment when Stroud asked her to remain
in the vehicle.

However, the fourth amendment proscribes only

"unreasonable" searches and seizures.

U.S. Const, amend. IV.

Thus, the question remaining is whether the detention of
defendant was "reasonable" under fourth amendment standards.
The appropriate standard for investigative detentions
was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

In Terry, the police officer observed

two men hovering on a street corner for an extended period of
time at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon.
5.

Terry, 392 U.S. at

The officer, who had patrolled this neighborhood for 30

years, observed the two men pace alternately along an identical
route, pausing to stare in the same store window about a dozen
times.

Ld. at 6.

Each completion of this route was followed by

a conference between the two men on the corner.

Ici. Based upon

his observation, the officer suspected that the men were about to
commit a robbery.

Id.

He further suspected that the men may be

armed. JUi.
The Court stated that in order to justify a seizure,
the officer must point to specific articulable facts which,
together with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that a person had committed
or was about to commit a crime.

I_d. at 21. The Court went on to

state:
And in making that assessment it is
imperative that the facts be judged against
an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search "warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief" that the
action taken was appropriate? Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a
result this Court has consistently refused to
sanction.
Id. 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citations omitted).

The officer is

entitled to draw reasonable inferences in light of his experience
in law enforcement.

I_d. at 27; see also United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 564.

(A trained law enforcement officer

may be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct
which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.)
The Terry Court emphasized that the reasonableness of
an investigative detention depends upon a delicate balancing of
the government's legitimate interest in crime prevention and
detection and the privacy and personal security of individuals.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22.

Applying these standards, the Court
-7-

concluded that the officer's "stop and frisk" were reasonable
under the fourth amendment.

j[d. at 30-31.

The reasonable suspicion standard also applies to
investigative stops involving vehicles.
470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).

United States v. Sharpe/

When "an officer stops a vehicle for a

traffic violation, he may briefly detain the vehicle and its
occupants while he examines the vehicle registration and the
driver's license."

State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah

1989) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).

An

officer, for his own protection, may "order a driver out of a
vehicle which has been stopped for a traffic violation."

State

v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).

Other courts have extended the Mimms

ruling to allow a police officer to detain passengers in a
routine traffic stop by also ordering the passengers out of the
vehicle.

People v. Branch, 134 Misc.2d 705, 512 N.Y.S.2d 642

(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1987); People v. Liviqni, 88 A.D.2d 386, 453
N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y.App.Div. 1982), order aff'd. by, 58 N.Y.2d 894,
460 N.Y.S.2d 530, 447 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1983); People v. David L.,
56 N.Y.2d 698, 451 N.Y.S.2d 722, 436 N.E.2d 1324 (N.Y.), cert.
denied 459 U.S. 866 (1982).

However, an investigative detention

must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the detention in the first place.

Terry, 392 U.S. at

20-21.
Applying the foregoing authority, Deputy Stroud's brief
detention of defendant was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the routine traffic stop.

The objective

facts articulated by Stroud in support of reasonable suspicion
are as follows:

(1) the vehicle was legally stopped for an

equipment violation; (2) the driver was not the registered owner
of the vehicle; and (3) there was no registration in the vehicle
(T. 6).
Reviewing these facts, the Court of Appeals deferred
"to the findings of the trial judge because of his preferred
position in evaluating the witnesses' credibility•"
P.2d at 328.

Johnson, 771

The trial court found that:

based on the evidence that has been given,
and taking into consideration both the
officer and the defendant were under oath and
gave slightly different versions of exactly
what happened, that the officer's testimony
in regards to the stopping being based on a
violation of the law and the driver not
having produced the, I believe it was the
driver's license that was valid at the time,
plus having no registration, there was no
indication of who the owner of the car was,
and the officer had some question in regards
to whether the car may possibly have been
stolen, although the testimony that was given
was that the — there was no recent notice
that there was a stolen vehicle and
particularly of this vehicle itself.
There was no registration in the vehicle,
and the driver herself was not the owner.
I think the officer had a legitimate
reason to ask the passenger as to her
identity to determine the identity of the
driver, because the vehicle's registration
was not present, and the owner was not known,
and I think the officer was exercising a
legitimate concern in regards to the
ownership of the vehicle and to whether the
vehicle may have possibly been either stolen
or being driven without possibly the owner's
consent.
(T. 46-47).

Based upon these facts, the trial court concluded

that "Deputy Stroud could have reasonably required defendant to
_Q_

remain seated in the stopped vehicle while he completed the
investigation and issued the citation."

(T. 47-48.)

Likewise, the Court of Appeals reviewed the record and
noted "that the trial court believed Stroud's testimony in
concluding there was an articulable suspicion that defendant had
committed a crime."

Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328. The Court of

Appeals further noted that prior to asking defendant for
identification, Stroud believed there was a reasonable
possibility the car was stolen because the owner was absent and
there was no registration.

.Id. at 328-29.

Stroud determined

that it was "reasonable to ask defendant her name to determine if
it corresponded with the owner's name he had learned prior to
stopping the vehicle."

JId. at 329.

The Court of Appeals further explained that the fact
that "Stroud initially chose to do a warrants check instead of a
stolen vehicle check is of no great significance because not all
stolen cars are reported immediately."

j^d.

The court determined

that the trial court was justified in determining that the brief
detention of defendant, as a passenger, was reasonably within the
scope of investigating whether the vehicle was lawfully
possessed.

Ld.

The length of the detention of defendant as a

passenger "did not take any longer than a normal traffic stop."
Id.

Thus, the Court held that the brief detention was not

unreasonable under the fourth amendment.

Id.

Notably, one judge dissented from the Court of Appeals
opinion.

Johnson, 771 P.2d at 329 (Orme, J., dissenting).

Judge

Orme simply disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Stroud

had an articulable suspicion that the car had been stolen.

He

would conclude that as a matter of law, !,the facts are just as
consistent with the more likely scenario that the driver borrowed
the car from its rightful owner."

Id.

adopts Judge Orme's legal conclusion.

In this appeal, defendant
However, Judge Orme's

factual analogy is flawed.
The key fact ignored in the analogy is that the
occupants of the vehicle informed Stroud that there was no
registration in the vehicle (T. 26). The lack of a vehicle
registration goes beyond the otherwise reasonable "borrowed car"
scenario.

It was this fact that caused Stroud to inquire about

defendant's identification and whether the occupants were
lawfully in possession.

Stroud's experience indicated to him

that a vehicle occupants' failure to produce a valid registration
is a reasonable basis to suspect that the occupants may not be in
lawful possession.

Under these circumstances, it was reasonable

for Stroud to continue to detain the driver and defendant to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information.

See, e.g., Mallerino v. State/ 190 Ga.App. 398, 379

S.E.2d 210, 213 (1989) .
In her brief, defendant cites several Utah cases in
support of her claim that Stroud lacked reasonable suspicion to
detain her.

(Brief of App. at pp. 10-11 (citing State v. Sierra,

754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674
(Utah 1985); State v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985)).

While

these cases set forth the reasonable suspicion standard, they are
distinguishable on one fact: each involved a determination of
whether it was reasonable to initially stop the suspects.

In the present case, defendant asserts that she was
initially detained at the moment the vehicle was stopped for an
equipment violation.

(Brief of App. at p. 2 (citing Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,

(1979); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d

1132, 1135 (Utah 1985).)

Since defendant had already been

lawfully detained as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a
traffic violation, the inquiry is whether it was reasonable to
continue the detention of defendant while investigating the
traffic stop.
In this vein, defendant argues that even if Stroud had
a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, this belief
did not automatically implicate defendant in any illegal
activity.

(Brief of App. at p. 12.)

In effect, she claims that

a passenger in a vehicle suspected to be stolen may not be
temporarily detained to investigate the suspicion.

Defendant's

argument lacks common sense.
Several legitimate governmental interests are promoted
by allowing a police officer to request that a passenger remain
seated while investigating a routine traffic stop.
safety of the officer.

First, the

Some experts suggest that it is safer for

a police officer in a routine traffic stop to not allow the
occupants to get out of the car.

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.

106, 119 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Second, to solicit the

passengers aid in identifying the driver and owner of the vehicle
in determining whether the driver has the owner's permission to
operate the vehicle.
1330 (1975).

United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 1327,

Third, to question the passenger whether he or she

is licensed to drive in the event that the driver is unable or
unlicensed to drive the vehicle from the scene of the stop.
State v. Davis, 452 So.2d 1208, 1212 (La- Ct. App. 1984).
Finally, where a routine traffic stop has escalated
into something more based upon a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot, a police officer may detain the
vehicle occupants for further investigation.

Mallerino v. State,

190 Ga.App. 398, 379 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1989).
Defendant also cites United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d
89 (9th Cir. 1973), in support of her claim.

However, the

factual background in Luckett is clearly distinguishable from the
case at hand.

In Luckett, the police officer detained an

individual to run a warrant check after the officer had issued
the individual a jay walking citation.

Id., at 90.

Since the

officer had satisfied the purpose of the initial stop, the court
found that no justification based upon reasonable suspicion
existed to continue the detention longer than necessary to issue
the citation.

^Id. at 91.

In the instant case, defendant was detained only so
long as necessary to issue the traffic citation to the driver of
the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger (T. 8-9).
Further, the detention was based upon reasonable suspicion that
the vehicle in which defendant was seated was stolen (T. 7-8).
Finally, defendant argues that "the decision of the
Court of Appeals leaves officers with unbridled discretion to
detain and run a warrants check on all passengers in vehicles
where the owner is not present.

(Brief of App. at p. 14.)

-13-

Again, defendant ignores the critical fact that the vehicle in
which defendant was a passenger lacked a valid registration.
While the absence of a vehicle registration is not proof that a
vehicle is stolen, it does give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that a vehicle is not lawfully possessed warranting further
investigation by an officer.

The Court of Appeals decision only

validates a brief "investigative" detention of a vehicle's
occupants if the owner is not present and there is no
registration in the vehicle.
Balancing the minimal intrusion on defendant's fourth
amendment interests against the legitimate governmental interest
in highway safety and crime detection, this Court should rule
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly found
that the detention of defendant was proper in the course of the
traffic stop and stolen vehicle investigation.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S MERE RECITATION OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN THE TRIAL COURT
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR
APPEAL.
Defendant argues that article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution provides greater protections than the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution.

Defendant also

argues that she sufficiently raised the state constitutional
issue in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.
Defendant's state constitutional claim should not be considered.
While defendant's motion to suppress cited the Utah
Constitution, her memorandum in support of her motion to suppress
did not analyze or argue state constitutional grounds other than

to simply allude to the state constitution (R. 20-28).

The Court

of Appeals stated that "[n]ominally alluding to such different
constitutional guarantees without any analysis before the trial
court does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit
consideration by this court on appeal."

Johnson, 111 P.2d at 328

(citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.
1987)).
Similarly, this Court in State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085
(Utah 1986), stated that although "Dorsey refers to Article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution in his brief, he makes no
attempt to rely on any asserted difference between the state and
federal provisions, and we decline to make any separate analysis
under Article I, section 14, assuming there is one to be made."
Id. at 1087 n.2. See also State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 31 n.l
(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989)
In the instant case, the trial court had no state
constitutional arguments before it and could only decide the
issue based on defendant's rights under the United States
Constitution.

See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 150 Vt. 483, 555 A.2d

369, 376-77 (1988), cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 1155 (1989).

As this

Court has pointed out, "motions to suppress should be supported
by precise averments, not conclusory allegations."

State v.

Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted).
Defendant argues that because state constitutional
principles are not well defined in Utah, she was not required to
engage in state constitutional analysis to preserve the issue for
appeal.

She claims that merely reciting to the trial court the

-15-

applicable state constitutional provision is sufficient to
preserve the issue.

Defendant's argument is self-contradicting.

In defendant's brief before this Court, she has engaged
in separate state constitutional analysis using the "sibling
state approach" outlined in State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500
A.2d 233 (1985), and recommended by this Court in State v. Earl,
716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986).

Notably, defendant cites three

cases from other states in which the courts independently
interpreted their respective state constitutional search and
seizure provisions.

State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska

1985); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984);
State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1369 (La. 1978), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Mack, 403 So.2d 8 (La. 1981).

Each case

predates defendant's motion to suppress and could have been
brought to the attention of the trial court.
Defendant's claimed "never-never land" of state
constitutional analysis is nothing more than studied ignorance.
Case law and periodicals on state constitutional analysis are
legion.

It must be the responsibility of counsel for a criminal

defendant to fairly raise a state constitutional issue so as to
permit the trial court to make a ruling based upon legal analysis
and authority.

The trial court cannot be expected to create

novel state constitutional principles out of "whole cloth."
In the present case, defendant merely recited the state
constitutional provision without even claiming that the state
provision should be interpreted more narrowly or broadly than the
federal constitution.

The trial court was not requested to

differentiate between the state and federal constitutions and
hence made its ruling solely on federal constitutional
principles.

Because defendant failed to argue in the trial court

that state constitutional provisions are more protective than
their federal counterparts, this Court should decline to consider
her state constitutional claim on direct appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this C&

.
day"~bf March, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
General
.. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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8TATE of Utah. Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Karen Marie JOHNSON, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870222-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 21, 1989.
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1989.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District, Salt Lake County, Raymond S.
Uno, J., of possession of controlled substance, and she appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Garff, J., held that* (1) motor
vehicle passenger was seized within meaning of Fourth Amendment when deputy
sheriff who had stopped vehicle took passenger's name and birthdate and expected
her to wait while he ran warrants check,
but (2) seizure of passenger, who became
defendant, constituted temporary detention
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that passenger had committed crime.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., filed dissenting opinion.
1. Criminal Law *=»103CK2)
Court of Appeals would not consider
claim raised for first time on appeal, that
Utah Constitution and law provide greater
protection than Fourth Amendment of
United States Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure. U.S.C.A.
ConsLAmend. 4; Const Art 1, J 14; U.C.
A.1953, 77-7-15.
2. Arrest *=*8<4)
Motor vehicle passenger was seized
within meaning of Fourth Amendment
when deputy sheriff who had stopped vehicle took passenger's name and birthdate
and expected her to wait while he ran war
rants check; under totality of the circumstances, passenger was reasonably justified
I. At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing

in belief that she was not free to go. U.S
C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
3. Automobiles *=»349(17, 18)
Fourth Amendment seizure of motoi
vehicle passenger constituted temporary
detention supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that passenger had committed
crime; trial judge believed deputy sheriffs
testimony that deputy believed there was
possibility vehicle he had stopped for having faulty brake light was stolen as driver
was not registered owner and was unable
to find vehicle registration, it was reasonable to ask passenger her name to determine if her names corresponded with owner's name that had been learned prior to
stopping of vehicle, and passenger was not
detained for unreasonable period of time.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt (argued),
Salt Lake Legal Defenders, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R.
Larsen (argued), Asst Atty. (Jen., for
plaintiff and respondent
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of her motion
to suppress and her conviction for possession of a controlled substance.1 We affirm.
On November 8, 1986, Deputy Sheriff
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a
faulty brake light Defendant was a passenger in that vehicle. At the suppression
hearing, Stroud testified that prior to
stopping the vehicle, he ran a check on the
license plate and obtained the name of the
registered owner. He then approached the
stopped vehicle and asked the driver for
her license. The name on the license was
not the name of the registered owner.
on defendant's motion to suppress.
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When Stroud requested the registration
certificate, the driver was unable to produce it Stroud then asked defendant for
identification, reasoning that there was a
possibility the car was stolen because there
was DO registration and no owner present.
After initially denying that she had any
identification, defendant told Stroud her
name and birth date.
Stating that he would be right back and
expecting the driver and defendant to re
main, Stroud returned to his vehicle and
ran license checks on the two, determining
that the driver was driving on a suspended
license and that defendant had several outstanding warrants. He did not, however,
inquire as to whether the car was stolen,
nor did he know of any reports of stolen
cars matching that car's description. He
then wrote a citation on the driver and
requested a backup police officer.
When defendant was informed that she
was being arrested for outstanding warrants, she exited the vehicle, holding a
backpack which had the name "Karen" on
it Defendant initially denied that the
backpack belonged to her, but later admitted that it was hers. Incident to her arrest, the bag was searched and was found
to contain amphetamines, drug paraphernalia and defendant's Utah identification.

and put her in the front seat of the sheriffs car. She had possession of her bag at
this time. Defendant stated that she gave
Stroud her name and birthdate because she
was required to do so, and did not believe
that she could leave.
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether
defendant may raise, for the first time on
appeal, the argument that state law and
article 1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution
provide greater protection than the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure; (2) whether defendant, a passenger
in a motor vehicle, was seized within the
meaning of the fourth amendment; and (3)
if there was a seizure, whether it was
reasonable.
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress,
we will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 19*1, 193 (Utah
1987). The trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility and accuracy
of the witnesses' divergent testimonies.
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-156,
(Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App.1988). However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a "correction of error" standard. Oates v. Chovez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988).

Defendant's version of the sequence of
events varies from Stroud's. She testified
that after Stroud received the driver's license, he asked defendant if she had any
identification. She said that she did not
He told them to wait, that he would be
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
right back, and returned to his vehicle for
[1] Defendant claims that her detention
five or ten minutes, long enough for her to
violated
the fourth amendment of the Unitsmoke a cigarette or two. When he reed
States
Constitution and article 1, section
turned, he asked for the registration certificate. Wrhen it could not be produced, 14 of the Utah Constitution. She also arStroud asked defendant to return to his gues that the legislative intent behind Utah
vehicle with him, where, at his request, she Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1980) was to provide
gave him her name and birthdate. He then greater protection against unreasonable
sent her back to the other car. Fifteen searches and seizures than is provided by
minutes later, he came back to their car, the fourth amendment, and that her seigave the driver a citation, took defendant zure violated the provisions of both constiout of the car, frisked and handcuffed her, tutions.1 However, defendant failed to
2» Utah has never drawn any distinctions between these two provisions and has "always
considered the protections afforded to be one
and the same." State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219.

1221 (Utah 1988). However, in a footnote comment, the court indicated that it has not ruled
out the possibility of making such a distinction
in a future case. Id. at n. 8.
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brief or argue these issues at the trial level
and first raised her statutory argument in
her appellate brief. Nominally alluding to
such different constitutional guarantees
without any analysis before the trial court
does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit consideration by this court on appeal.
James r. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah
CtApp.1987). "[W]here a defendant fails
to assert a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal
[MJotions to
suppress should be supported by precise
averments, not conclusory allegations
"
Stat* v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah
1985). Also, in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48,
53 (Utah 1981), the supreme court stated:
There is nothing in the record to indicate
that the point now urged upon this Court
was unavailable or unknown to defendant at the time he filed his motion to
suppress, and to entertain the point now
would be to sanction the practice of withholding positions that should properly be
presented to the trial court but which
may be withheld for the purpose of seeking a reversal on appeal and a new trial
or dismissal.
We, therefore, decline to consider this argument on appeal.
SEIZURE
[2] Defendant avers that she was
seized within the meaning of the fourth
amendment because she felt that she was
not free to leave when Stroud told her to
wait while he returned to his vehicle to
check on the driver's license and to run a
warrants check on defendant "A seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment occurs only when the officer by
means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of
a person." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85,
87 (Utah CtApp.1987). Further, "[w]hen a
reasonable person, based on the totality of
the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation . . . but because he believes he is not free to leave," a seizure
occurs. Id; see also United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct
1870, 1877, 64 LEd.2d 497 (1980). Defen-

dant was, therefore, seized when Strou(
took her name and birthdate and expected
her to wait while he ran a warrants check
Under the totality of the circumstances
defendant was reasonably justified in her
belief that she was not free to go.
(3] Now, the concern is whether the
seizure was reasonable and permissible under the fourth amendment. In State v.
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court adopted
the reasoning in United States v. Merritt,
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), wherein
the Fifth Circuit specified three constitutionally permissible levels of police stops:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if
the officer has an "articulable suspicion"
that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime; however, the
"detention must be temporary and last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed or is being committed.
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18.
We conclude that the present case involves a "level two" stop. Thus, to justify
the seizure, Stroud had to have a reasonable "articulable suspicion" that defendant
had committed a crime. To determine if he
acted reasonably under the circumstances,
"due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1883,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
At this point, we defer to the findings of
the trial judge because of his preferred
position in evaluating the witnesses' credibility. See Arroyo, at 154-156. The
record indicates that the trial court believed Stroud's testimony in concluding
there was an articulable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime. Prior to
asking defendant for identification, Stroud
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believed that there was a possibility the car
was stolen because the owner was absent
and there was no registration He knew
that the driver was not the owner, but
determined that it was reasonable to ask
defendant her name to determine if it corresponded with the owner's name he had
learned prior to stopping the vehicle The
fact that Stroud initially chose to do a
warrants check instead of a stolen vehicle
check is of no great significance because
not all stolen cars are reported immediately. The trial judge stated that where there
is a legitimate traffic stop, the driver has a
suspended license, and there is "no way of
telling who the owner of the vehicle is and
whether they have permission to drive it
because the owner is not present," a reasonable officer would inquire regarding the
identity of a passenger. In weighing the
testimony, the court was justified in finding that the amount of time defendant was
required to wait, even though a passenger,
was reasonable and did not take any longer
than a normal traffic stop
Thus, there was substantial evidence for
the trial court to find as it did Although a
seizure occurred, it conformed to constitutional requirements in that Officer Stroud
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that
the car could have been stolen, and defendant was not detained for an unreasonable

period of time. We, therefore, affirm defendant's conviction.
DAVIDSON, J., concurs.
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
Although the legal analysis applicable to
this case is ably set out in the majority's
opinion, I cannot agree with their ultimate
conclusion that the arresting officer had an
articulable suspicion that the automobile
had been stolen, much less that defendant
had in any way participated in the theft.
The only facts relied on by the officer
were that the driver's name was not the
name of the registered owner and the driver was not able to locate the registration
certificate. These facts are just as consistent with the more likely scenario that the
driver borrowed the car from its rightful
owner. Absent more—and this is all the
officer pointed to—there was simply no
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law,
that the car had been stolen
I would accordingly reverse.
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